INTRODUCTION
Retributivism is the view that criminal punishment is justified in large part (and perhaps entirely) by an offender's deserving to be punished. Retributivism is almost certainly the most prominent and influential contemporary theory of punishment. Yet this view is controversial, particularly regarding questions about desert. Retributivists disagree among themselves about the appropriate bases of desert 1 and what a criminal offender deserves. 2 Retributivists also disagree with punishment theorists of other stripes about whether criminal offenders can (or routinely do) deserve punishment or harsh treatment. Part II more fully articulates Retributivist Criminal Procedure and shows how it follows logically from Refined Retributivism. Retributivist Criminal Procedure imposes a causation requirement: in order for someone's punishment to be permissible, the considerations in virtue of which she deserves to be punished must causally influence the infliction of punishment on her.
Retributivist Criminal Procedure also imposes a minimal standard of epistemic justification:
punishing someone for an offense is permissible only if there is (at least) good reason to believe that she deserves to be punished for that offense. At the systemic level, Retributivist Criminal
Procedure holds that criminal procedure institutions may not accept deviations from the causation requirement or the epistemic justification standard in order to realize other procedural values.
Part III analyzes several implications of Retributivist Criminal Procedure. Retributivist
Criminal Procedure provides a novel, unified critique of criminal justice practices (such as pretextual stops, pretextual prosecutions, and plea bargaining) that are both common in the United States and widely condemned on other grounds. Yet Retributivist Criminal Procedure is also in tension with several procedural rules and norms that are central to the U.S. system of criminal justice and several others that are integral to any just criminal procedure. Thus, Refined
Retributivism, like Simple Retributivism, is difficult to reconcile with due process values.
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I. RETRIBUTIVISM, SIMPLE AND REFINED
Retributivism has many varieties. Every version of retributivism posits an important connection between punishment and desert, although some specify this connection imprecisely. Consider the following formulation.
Simple Retributivism: An infliction of punishment is justified when a person is punished to the extent that is warranted by his desert bases.
Desert bases can be construed broadly to include all of the characteristics, patterns of deliberation, and/or conduct in virtue of which an offender might deserve punishment.
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Retributivists disagree about many of the terms in Simple Retributivism-for example, over what counts as punishment and what constitutes a desert basis. Aside from these internecine disputes, a broader criticism of Simple Retributivism is that it leaves out aspects of the effectuation of punishment that are important generally, aspects that should be especially important to retributivists.
Simple Retributivism should be avoided for several reasons. The following case illustrates one such reason.
Proxy: Social scientific evidence establishes that a system in which judgments about criminal charges and criminal liability are made solely by utilizing proxies for deservingness (e.g., past criminal history, race and socio-economic status, residence in a high-crime neighborhood, neck tattoos) results in more accurate determinations than a system that requires legally proving the defendant's desert bases as a precondition to meting out punishment. Based on these findings, the 9 Throughout this article, I use the term "due process" in a generic sense to indicate the procedural values necessary for a just and legitimate system of criminal punishment. My claim about retributivism and due process does not depend on any specific legal or theoretical interpretation of what process is due in the investigation and prosecution of crimes. Thanks to Alec Walen for encouraging me to clarify this point. 10 JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 58 (1970). criminal justice system is reformed so that all charging and liability judgments are based on these proxies.
Under this reformed system, Donny is charged with robbing Victoria and found liable for this crime because he possess a sufficient number of the proxy factors (including that he has a criminal history, is classified as AfricanAmerican, comes from a bad neighborhood, and has a neck tattoo). As it happens, Donny actually committed the robbery of Victoria for which he is charged and found liable. Therefore, the proxy mechanism produced an accurate punishment in Donny's case.
The mechanism described in Proxy conflicts with basic aspects of due process and guarantees of equal protection under law, for many of the reasons pointed out by critics of so-called "risk prediction" in the criminal justice system.
11 Yet although this proxy mechanism is problematic, the infliction of punishment in this case does not run afoul of Simple Retributivism. Donny deserves to be punished for robbing Victoria, and he is punished.
What, exactly, is troubling about Proxy? According to one version of retributivism, punishment is more than something that happens in the wake of wrongdoing. Rather, punishment publicly responds to an offender's wrongdoing that condemns the wrongdoer, vindicates the system of law that the wrongdoer violated, and communicates support to the victims (if any) of the wrongdoing. 12 On these "response" versions of retributivism, Proxy is unsatisfactory because the proxy system uses substitutes for desert bases to mete out punishment. Since the infliction of punishment in Proxy is determined solely by these substitutes, it does not respond to Donny's wrongdoing as such. Another version of retributivism posits a specific relationship between an offender's desert bases and her punishment, and so would have different objections to Proxy. For example, David Brink defines retributivism as the view that "reactive attitudes and practices of blame and punishment should track desert…."
13 The contention that punishment should track an offender's desert bases can be distinguished from the weaker contention that punishment should merely correspond to an offender's desert bases. Tracking implies that the process of meting out punishment must itself be sensitive to an offender's desert bases, that changes in an offender's desert bases must reliably prompt changes in her punishment. 14 Correspondence does not require this sensitivity. A stopped clock is insensitive to the passage of time, yet its face sometimes corresponds to the correct time. Likewise, in Proxy a procedure that is insensitive to the offender's desert bases nonetheless generates an outcome that corresponds to them. Here, the insensitive procedure winds up producing an answer that is both correct and identical to the one that a sensitive decision procedure would have produced. On the "tracking" version of retributivism, then, the problem in Proxy is that punishment corresponds to, but does not track, Donny's desert bases. If Donny had manifest no desert bases related to Victoria's robbery but had the same proxies (e.g., the same origins, race, criminal history and tattoos), then the procedural mechanisms would have generated the same conclusion about his liability to punishment.
Neither the "response" nor the "tracking" versions of retributivism can be satisfied simply by the realization of a state of affairs in which the deserving have been punished. Rather, her desert bases. If such proportionality or commensurability were accidental, then the offender would not be punished because she deserves it.
The causal notion helps explain why the Proxy case is problematic for retributivism. Say that a token infliction of punishment is accurate when it corresponds to the offender's desert bases. The retributivist cannot be satisfied by a punishment infliction (as in Proxy) that is accurate but in which the offender's desert bases play no causal role. Even though the verdict in Proxy is accurate, his desert bases do not figure into the explanation of why he is punished.
Therefore, the infliction of punishment in this case is normatively unjustified.
More broadly, the retributivist should condemn a criminal procedure mechanism that assigns no role to desert bases in the infliction of punishment. This condemnation applies regardless of the overall accuracy of the results that the mechanism generates. Put differently, the 15 See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 347 (1983) ("Briefly stated, a retributivist claims that punishment is justified because people deserve it."); Alice Ristroph, Just Violence, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 1017 REV. , 1040 REV. (2014 ("The basic retributive idea is that punishment is justified because the offender deserves it…."); Stephen P. Garvey, Is It Wrong to Commute Death Row? Retribution, Atonement, and Mercy, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1319 , 1324 (2004 ("Retributive justice obligates the state to punish an offender because and to the extent, but only to the extent, he deserves to be punished."). 16 Other retributivists go further, contending that an offender's desert bases must be the sole causal influence on the infliction of punishment. See, e.g., MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 91 (1997) ("Retributivism is a very straightforward theory of punishment: We are justified in punishing because and only because offenders deserve it."); Christopher, supra note 7, at 859. 17 Note that the claim here concerns whether punishment is normatively justified. The Refined Retributivist might also embrace the stronger claim that a gesture lacking the requisite etiology is not punishment at all, even if it resembles punishment in all other respects. retributivist should be skeptical about a purely instrumental notion of criminal procedure, one in which the goals of the system are set by normative theory and mechanisms of implementation are justified solely in virtue of how well they implement those goals. 20 Such instrumentalism would neglect the essential causal role for an offender's desert bases in the process of meting out his punishment.
For the retributivist, though, it is not enough that an offender's desert bases merely play some causal role in punishment. Consider a second case, adapted from an example by Christopher Heath Wellman.
21
Lottery: Authorities conduct a lottery to select who will be punished for highprofile, unsolved crime. Authorities think it is highly likely that Diana was the perpetrator of the crime. Thus, she is given four balls in the lottery, while everyone else is given only one. One of Diana's balls is selected in the lottery, and she is punished for the crime. As it happens, Diana is actually the person who committed the crime.
Like Proxy, Lottery would clearly be inconsistent with due process. The lottery process violates the requirement that the state must introduce evidence of and prove (beyond a reasonable doubt) every element of every offense with which the defendant is charged. The lottery also violates Diana's rights to confront her accusers and challenge the evidence against her. Further, the lottery contravenes Diana's right to assist in her own defense because it eliminates the possibility that she could defend herself at all from the charges against her. the penal lottery realizes the kind of causation requirement described above, since Diana's desert bases have some causal influence on her punishment-the increased number of Diana's balls in the lottery increases the chances that she will be punished.
For the retributivist, then, justified punishment requires a tighter connection between desert bases and punishment than is realized in Lottery. 26 Although Diana's desert bases figure into the decision to punish her, they figure only indirectly. These desert bases should figure more directly if Diana's punishment is to be normatively justified.
The connection between desert bases and punishment might be tightened in two respects.
First, an offender's desert bases should make a more significant causal contribution to her punishment than they do in Lottery. Diana's desert bases exert too remote an influence on her punishment because her culpable wrongdoing only marginally increases the prospect that she will be punished, even though officials think it is highly probable that she committed the crime.
In cases like this, a retributivist should require an offender's desert bases to generate a greater increase in the chances that she will be punished.
Second, an offender's desert bases should figure robustly, rather than contingently, into Yet even these modifications are not enough to meet all the due process challenges facing Simple Retributivism. Consider a third case.
Evil Alibi: Delilah is charged with robbing Valerie five years ago. However, judicial proceedings definitively establish that, at the time of the robbery of Valerie, Delilah was actually robbing and murdering Theresa in another jurisdiction in which the statute of limitations for all crimes is three years. Delilah is nonetheless convicted of and punished for robbing Valerie, on the rationale that exoneration of this crime would let her off the hook for her crimes against Theresa.
In the Evil Alibi case, Delilah's desert bases (that is, her culpable wrongdoing) causally influence her punishment. These desert bases also figure directly and robustly into the 30 On epistemic accounts that adopt the "safety" principle as a requirement for knowledge, S's belief in p counts as knowledge only if "in most nearby possible worlds in which S continues to form her belief about [p] in the same way as in the actual world the belief continues to be true." Duncan Pritchard, Anti-Luck Epistemology, 158 SYNTHESE 277, 282-83 (2007 Intuitively, however, punishment in the Evil Alibi case does not seem to be justified or legitimate. It is certainly inconsistent with due process. The explanation is that Delilah is innocent, but in a sense that might seem trivial. Say that someone is trivially innocent of an offense when she did not commit that offense, but committed another offense (or offenses) of at least equal seriousness. In Evil Alibi, Delilah is trivially innocent of robbing Valerie because, although she did not rob Valerie, she committed the more serious offenses of robbing and murdering Theresa.
As a matter of due process, being trivially innocenct of a charged offense is a barrier to being punished for that crime. In the U.S. criminal justice system, punishments are based on specifically charged offenses. Punishment for uncharged offenses is illegitimate, and innocence of a charged offense is sufficient to establish immunity to punishment for that offense. 31 The offense restriction, then, is the notion that a defendant's desert bases only bear on her liability to punishment if they are related to the offense for which she is charged.
The offense restriction seems so basic that retributivists often take it for granted. over consequentialism. 34 Second, that trivial innocence bars conviction is a fundamental element of due process, although (arguably) not an independent tenet of U.S. constitutional law.
35
To rule out conviction of the trivially innocent, a retributivist should permit only desert bases related to the charged offense to cause the offender to be punished. Someone's characteristics or conduct unrelated to the charged offense may not causally influence her liability to punishment, even if these non-offense-related desert bases are (in the abstract) sufficient to justify punishment. The retributivist is therefore committed to the seeing a defendant's desert bases as non-fungible determinants of whether punishment is justifiably imposed on her.
To recap, Proxy is problematic because the defendant's desert bases do not play a causal role in the offender's punishment; Lottery is problematic because the defendant's desert bases figure too contingently into her punishment; and Evil Alibi is problematic because the 34 See, e.g., R. A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 154 (1991) ("A system of [consequentialist] punishment is most obviously defective if it involves the deliberate punishment of the innocent."). A Refined Retributivist might argue that punishing the trivially innocent is acceptable (and thus resist the impetus to refine Simple Retributivism) in a few possible ways. First, the Refined Retributivist might identify commission of the offense as part of the desert basis. This would be tantamount to adopting "legal," rather than "moral," retributivism. However, this invocation of legal retributivism would beg the question that is of interest here-namely, whether there is logical space between the proposition "the defendant got what she deserved" and "the defendant got what she deserved to get for the charged offense." Alternatively, one might deny that the trivially innocent are innocent in a way that would preclude the normative justification for punishing them. Along these lines, the Refined Retributivist might appeal to a version of "whole-life" view of punishment. PHIL. 365 (1972) . Such a "whole-life" view would support the argument that what someone has done over her whole life is relevant to whether she should be punished. However, this strategy is not promising because, as Tadros notes, the whole-life view is a reductio to be avoided. See TADROS, THE ENDS OF HARM, at 68-73. inappropriate desert bases cause the defendant's punishment. These cases suggest the following alternative to Simple Retributivism.
Refined Retributivism: An infliction of punishment is normatively justified if, and only if, (a) a person is punished because of and to the extent that is warranted by his offense-related desert bases, and (b) these offense-related desert bases figure significantly and robustly into the determination that he is liable to punishment.
In essence, Refined Retributivism adds the causation requirement and the offense restriction to Simple Retributivism. A retributivist who finds the Proxy, Lottery, and Evil Alibi cases to be problematic should accept Refined Retributivism and reject Simple Retributivism.
Without fully defending Refined Retributivism here, two contentions can be made on its behalf. First, Refined Retributivism is consistent with due process in a way that Simple Retributivism is not. The examples above indicate that Simple Retributivism is highly revisionist. In denying the offense restriction, it does not require that punishment be meted out based on charged offenses. Nor does it capture numerous due process considerations that are essential to justified punishment, such as rules requiring the prosecution to prove every element of a charged offense or precluding the infliction of criminal punishment based solely on the defendant's bad character or prior bad actions. Yet each of these considerations is integral to the legitimacy of a criminal justice system, and each is also consistent with Refined Retributivism.
Limiting punishment to charged offenses (rather than allowing it to be based on prior acts or bad character) furthers the offense restriction by ensuring that only offense-related desert bases provide the basis for punishment. Similarly, many evidentiary rules (for example, those requiring the exclusion of character evidence or evidence of prior criminal behavior) operate to ensure that an offender is not deemed liable to punishment because of desert bases unrelated to the charged offense.
A second contention on behalf of Refined Retributivism is that it is compatible with (indeed, implicit in) existing retributivist theories. To demonstrate this point, consider the retributivist theories advanced by Michael Moore and Mitchell Berman.
36 Both of these highly sophisticated theories can be read to embrace either Simple or Refined Retributivism. However,
Refined Retributivism ultimately provides best interpretation of each view.
According to Moore, the function of criminal law is to attain "retributive justice," which demands "that those who deserve punishment get it." 37 In places, Moore offers a teleological interpretation of retributive justice. "To serve retributive justice," he contends, "criminal law must punish all and only those who are morally culpable in the doing of some morally wrongful action." 38 Moore's formulation here presupposes an instrumentalist approach to criminal procedure: criminal procedure should effectuate the punishment of all and only the deserving.
For Moore, retributivism entails an obligation to "set up institutions so that retribution is achieved." 39 Moore's use of the passive voice indicates that what matters is attaining retribution, rather than the specific way that retribution is attained. This formulation of Moore's theory therefore invokes Simple Retributivism: justice is achieved whenever (and criminal procedure should ensure that) all and only those who have acted in a morally wrongful way are punished.
This interpretation of Moore's view would omit both the causation requirement and the offense restriction.
Elsewhere, however, Moore interprets retributive justice in a way that more closely resembles Refined Retributivism. "To achieve retributive justice," Moore argues, "the 36 The focus on Moore's and Berman's theories is exemplary. A host of other varieties of retributivism can also be formulated in terms of Refined Retributivism.
37 MOORE, supra note 16, at 33. 38 Id. at 35. 39 Id. at 91 (emphasis added). punishment must be inflicted because the offender did the offence. To the extent that someone is punished for reasons other than that he deserves to be punished, retributive justice is not achieved."
40 This formulation suggests both the causation requirement (that an offender's desert bases should figure directly into story of the infliction of punishment on him) and the offense restriction (the only desert bases that should play this causal role are those related to the offense).
By implication, a token of punishment violates retributive justice if the offender's desert bases do not figure in the infliction or if extraneous considerations do.
Thus, Moore seems to offer two slogans for retributive justice: "Punish all and only those people who deserve to be punished" and "Punish a person for a crime because (and only if) he deserves to be punished for that crime." These two slogans are not equivalent. Each leads to different verdicts about the legitimacy of punishment in particular cases, and each presupposes a different view about the point of criminal procedure. "Punish all and only those people who deserve to be punished" can countenance the punishment of a morally culpable offender based on considerations other than her desert bases (as in Proxy) or for offenses other than those with which she has been charged (as in Evil Alibi). Given Moore's interpretation of retributivism in causal terms, the slogan "Punish a person for a crime because (and only if) he deserves to be punished for that crime" seems to be the more considered formulation of Moore's view. This slogan is consistent with Refined Retributivism and inconsistent with Simple Retributivism.
Mitchell Berman's "integrated dualist" theory of punishment also might be taken to embrace both Simple and Refined Retributivism. Berman distinguishes "core" cases (which involve "imposition of [punishment] on an actual offender on account of his offense, and only so long as the imposition satisfies some reasonable proportionality constraint, whether of a 40 Id. at 28.
retributivist or Benthamite variety") 41 from "peripheral" cases (which "involve imposition of punishment on persons who are not wrongdoers, either because no offense occurred or because, although it did, the individual was not responsible for it"). 42 Berman argues that retributivism offers the best justification for punishment in core cases, although some form of consequentialism justifies punishment in peripheral cases. 43 However, it is difficult to pin down whether Berman's account of the retributivist justification for punishment in core cases is an example of Simple or Refined Retributivism. At one point, Berman contends that "core cases of punishment are justified because the offender's desert renders the fact that punishment inflicts suffering wholly inert as a reason against it-that is, the offender's suffering is not a bad and no right of his is infringed." 44 Berman also describes his position as "that wrongdoers deserve to suffer on account of their blameworthy wrongdoing." 45 These statements seem to embrace the causation requirement, but not the offense restriction. In both of these statements, the transformative agent is the offender's wrongdoing as such, rather than his offense-related desert bases in particular.
Elsewhere, Berman embraces the offense restriction, but only in part.
[C]ore cases of punishment are justified, against the suffering they inflict, by cancellation. When the person punished is morally responsible for the commission of an offense, then her suffering on account of that offense, and commensurate with her blameworthiness, simply is not a bad. 47 The causation requirement might be implicit in Berman's view. Recall that, on Berman's definition, core cases of punishment involve punishment (and suffering) "on account of" an offense. Much hangs on whether the "on account of" is understood in a normative sense (that an offender's offense must provide a fundamental justification for her punishment), causally (that punishment must be prompted by an offender's offending), or in some other way. One plausible interpretation of "on account of" is that the offense must both ground and prompt the imposition of punishment. If so, then the causation requirement would apply globally to Berman's argument. 48 The offense restriction, too, might be read out of Berman's broader claim that punishment be "on account of" an offense. On one natural reading of this phrase, any version of retributivism necessarily rules out impositions prompted by non-offense-related desert bases because tokens caused by those desert bases would not be "on account of" an offense. The general applicability of the offense restriction is also suggested by Berman's concession that "pre-offense suffering is strictly irrelevant to the offender's liability to punishment." Id., at 269. To be sure, Berman does not discuss the (ir)relevance of pre-offense desert bases. However, it would be strange to posit that pre-offense suffering is irrelevant to the justification of punishment, while allowing that pre-offense desert bases could matter.
state's infliction of that punishment is justified if, and only if, the offender's offense-related desert bases cause the infliction of punishment.
Retributivists, then, should embrace Refined Retributivism over Simple Retributivism.
Simple Retributivism licenses egregious due process violations that Refined Retributivism does not. Refined Retributivism is also implicit in many extant versions of retributivism and provides the best interpretations of two of the most sophisticated theories of retributivism.
II. REFINED RETRIBUTIVISM AND RETRIBUTIVIST CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Unlike Simple Retributivism, Refined Retributivism sees criminal procedure as integral to the justification of punishment. If Refined Retributivism is the superior view, then it follows that at least some questions about criminal procedure matter centrally to the normative justification of punishment-that "just punishment" presupposes a "just process."
49 Defending Refined
Retributivism therefore requires articulating a Retributivist Criminal Procedure. On Refined Retributivism, the offense restriction states the epistemic goal for which the adjudicator's performance matters. To find that a defendant is liable to be punished for an offense, the adjudicator must have a good reason to believe (or, on some accounts of justification, must believe for a good reason) that she has manifested offense-related desert bases. If any standard less demanding than justification applied, then the defendant's punishment would not be caused by her offense-related desert bases in the way that Refined Retributivism calls for.
To be sure, Refined Retributivism might impose a more demanding epistemic standard than justification. For example, the Refined Retributivist might adopt a "justified true belief" standard, requiring that the adjudicator have a justified true belief that the offender manifested offense-related desert bases. 53 Under such a "justified true belief" standard, but not under the justification standard, "a verdict based on justified beliefs will still have failed its [epistemic] aim if it turns out to be false." 54 An even more demanding "knowledge" standard would require that the adjudicator know (rather than merely having a justified true belief) that the offender manifested offense-related desert bases. 55 The justified true belief standard fails to rule out the possibility that the protagonists in Gettier cases have knowledge. However, the usual intuition is that these protagonists do not have knowledge. considerations that make justified true beliefs insufficient for knowledge in Gettier cases also make it the case that legal verdicts based solely on justified true beliefs fail to achieve their epistemic goal.
56 On Pardo's view, legal verdicts "require more than truth and justification….
truth and justification also need to be connected in an appropriate way" in order "to achieve their goal or aim." 57 Although there might be benefits to these more demanding epistemic standards, there might also potential drawbacks. For the purposes of assessing Retributivist Criminal Procedure, however, it does not matter which epistemic standard the Refined Retributivist adopts, so long as the standard is at least as demanding as the justification standard.
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Commentators such as H. L. Ho, Jordi Ferrer Beltrán, and Pardo defend justification as a general legal standard. On their position, any normatively justified verdict must meet a standard at least as demanding as epistemic justification. 59 For our purposes, it is unnecessary to provide such a general defense of the justification standard. Rather, the point is that Refined
Retributivism is committed to the justification standard in the context of punishment-in particular, for the adjudication that the offender has manifested desert bases related to the offense with which he is charged.
Another core aspect of Retributivist Criminal Procedure is the causation requirement described above in Part I. For a punishment infliction to be normatively justified, the defendant's 56 Pardo, supra note 53, at 50. As noted below, the Refined Retributivist's substantive commitment to the causation requirement might provide an independent route to avoid the Gettier-style counterexamples that arise under weaker epistemic standards than knowledge and (according to Pardo) allow legal verdicts to fall short of their epistemic goal.
57 Id. at 52. 58 Moreover, each of the implications of Retributivist Criminal Procedure described in Part III is cognizable regardless of whether the applicable epistemic standard is justification, justified true belief, or knowledge. 59 To be sure, this contention is disputed. Alex Stein, for example, acknowledges that adjudicative fact-finding involves "relaxed" criteria that "do not even purport to satisfy the 'justified true belief' standard or similar criteria for knowledge." ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 59 (2005). offense-related desert bases must exert a direct and robust influence on the determination that she is liable to punishment. Otherwise, she is not punished because she deserves it. This causation requirement is a substantive commitment of Refined Retributivism. LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY 13 (2006) . 62 The justification standard and the causation requirement do not necessarily exhaust Retributivist Criminal Procedure. For example, the Refined Retributivist might (after Pardo) require a more demanding epistemic standard than justification. However, these two notions seem like a baseline for Retributivist Criminal Procedure. No Refined Retributivist could settle for an epistemic standard less exacting than justification. Nor could a Refined Retributivist countenance punishment based on accidents or deviant causal chains. Therefore, these two notions are treated as equivalent to Retributivist Criminal Procedure for the remainder of the article. 63 Simple Retributivism might also be formulated as applying at the level of systems and the level of cases. Moreover, it is possible that a case-focused version of Simple Retributivism could avoid some of the due process infirmities highlighted in Part I. Thanks to Craig Agule and Mihailis Diamantis for identifying this discrepancy.
there is no good reason for the adjudicator to believe that the offender manifested offense-related desert bases as alleged-would thus be normatively unjustified. So, too, would an infliction in which the adjudicator has justified beliefs about the offender's desert bases, but these beliefs do not causally influence the offender's liability to punishment.
At the systemic level, Retributivist Criminal Procedure calls for adjudication mechanisms that appropriately track the desert bases of offenders. The systemic logic of Retributivist Criminal Procedure requires eliminating invalid verdicts.
64 Since Refined Retributivism cannot countenance an invalid verdict when assessing a specific case, consistency requires a similar intolerance to invalid verdicts when assessing criminal justice institutions as a whole. In other words, the Refined Retributivist cannot simultaneously treat desert as categorically important at the token level but only contingently important (that is, capable of being overridden by other values or benefits) at the system level.
Retributivist Criminal Procedure's commitment to avoiding invalid verdicts has a number of practical implications, some of which are explored in more depth in Part III. At a minimum, Refined Retributivism favors standards of proof and rules of evidence to ensure that verdicts implicate the offender's offense-related desert bases in the requisite way. Refined Retributivism also demands that each defendant have opportunities to avoid punishment inflictions that lack epistemic justification-for example, by having the opportunity to challenge a sentence on the grounds that one's offense-related desert bases did not appropriately figure into the determination of one's liability. 64 Saying that Retributivist Criminal Procedure cannot countenance any invalid verdicts does not imply that minimizing such verdicts is its only possible goal. To be sure, the minimization of inaccurate and invalid verdicts is certainly an overriding goal of certain (deontic) retributivist theories, which emphasize the claim that retributivism precludes punishment of the innocent. However, the same is not true of other versions of retributivism, such as those that prioritize realization of the intrinsic good of punishing the deserving. See, e.g., Cahill, supra note 8, at 833-34. At the systemic level, Retributivist Criminal Procedure's commitment to avoiding invalid verdicts contrasts with the view that promoting accuracy is the main goal of criminal procedure.
One position along these lines is that criminal procedure should be assessed based on "case accuracy," or whether "the result in a particular case was correct." 65 Another position is that the goal of criminal procedure is "systemic accuracy," or the maximization of 69 To borrow Bentham's distinction, the deterrence theorist sees criminal adjudication as an "adjective branch of law," in that it modifies the "substantive" branch of the law. JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of Judicial Procedure with the Outlines of a Procedure Code, in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 6 (John Bowring ed., 1843). On Bentham's version of deterrence, the primary goal of adjectival law is to "insure that the will of the legislator is carried out," and "the best way to do this is to insure that the law is accurately applied." Gerald J. Postema, The Principle of Utility and the Law of Procedure: Bentham's Theory of Adjudication, 11 GA. L. REV. 1393 REV. , 1416 REV. (1977 . Since, for the deterrence theorist, the primary point of criminal law is to deter wrongdoing, the procedural goal of systemic accuracy is important to the extent that inaccuracy blunts the criminal law's deterrent effect. See, e.g., id., at 1421; see also Kaplow, supra note 68, at 310; Dripps, supra note 6, at 415. accuracy of outcomes in individual cases." 70 Along these lines, Michael Cahill sees systemic accuracy as the lodestar of retributivism's criminal procedure. On Cahill's consequentialistflavored version of retributivism, the goal of the criminal justice system is to "maximize the total amount of deserved punishment the system imposes," with the total being a function of "the number of offenders caught, the amount of (deserved) punishment per offender, and the cost of apprehending each offender." 71 Cahill contemplates that the retributivist might even favor rules of criminal procedure that "generate results that run counter to desert in some cases," so long as these rules have the effect of "making retributively 'right' outcomes more likely" in the Retributivist Criminal Procedure therefore departs from the goal of maximizing accuracy by ruling out mechanisms that would increase accuracy at the cost of generating invalid verdicts.
Retributivist principles of criminal procedure cannot sacrifice the causation requirement or epistemic justification for other procedural goals. A society whose criminal procedure aims to maximize systemic accuracy should utilize the mechanism described in Proxy if doing so would lead to more accurate verdicts over the range of cases. Yet Refined Retributivism reaches the opposite conclusion: the proxy mechanism violates Retributivist Criminal Procedure because the defendant's offense-related desert bases do not exert the requisite causal influence.
To be sure, the proponent of Retributivist Criminal Procedure can see accuracy as an important procedural value. A Refined Retributivist might well construe verdict validity and accuracy as jointly paramount criminal procedure goals. 73 Yet whether accuracy and validity are both overriding goals is a substantive question on which Refined Retributivists might disagree.
The point here is not to resolve this question. Rather, for every version of Refined Retributivism, an invalid verdict provides sufficient grounds for condemning a punishment infliction as normatively unjustified.
To summarize: for an infliction of punishment to be normatively justified under Retributivist Criminal Procedure, (a) a defendant's offense-related desert bases must causally influence her liability to punishment, and (b) the adjudicator must at least be epistemically justified in believing (or have an epistemically justified belief) that the defendant has exhibited 73 For example, some versions of Refined Retributivism might adopt a more demanding epistemic standard than justification (e.g., justified true belief or knowledge) as a precondition for normatively justifying any punishment infliction. To require that verdicts be true in addition to being justified is to enshrine accuracy as a goal of criminal procedure. On these more demanding epistemic standards, a verdict would be normatively justified only if it were both epistemically justified, causally appropriate, and accurate. See, e.g., LAUDAN, supra note 61, at 14. On this move, the epistemic goals of justification and causation would not have priority over the epistemic goal of accuracy. However, neither could justification (or causation) be traded off for accuracy. Rather, accuracy and validity would be jointly necessary for the normative justification of punishment inflictions.
offense-related desert bases. If either the causation requirement or the justification standard is violated, then an infliction of punishment is normatively unjustified. At the system level, Retributivist Criminal Procedure calls for mechanisms that reduce or eliminate invalid verdicts, independently of whether such mechanisms realize other procedural values (such as fairness or accuracy).
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF RETRIBUTIVIST CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Retributivist Criminal Procedure seems to call for significant revision to U.S. criminal justice institutions. These revisionist tendencies provide a route to challenge both Retributivist Criminal Procedure and Refined Retributivism more broadly.
To be sure, Refined Retributivism and Retributivist Criminal Procedure can explain many features of due process. The notion that punishment must be meted out based on charged offenses is consistent with the causation requirement. So is the idea that the prosecution has the burden to prove each element of a charged offense. To adhere to the justification standard, each defendant must be allowed to contest her charges or conviction on the grounds of legal sufficiency-for example, by contending that the state has failed to produce sufficient evidence regarding each element of every crime for which the defendant is convicted.
However, Retributivist Criminal Procedure would seem to call for at least two broad types of changes to the U.S. criminal justice system. First, a direct application of Retributivist
Criminal Procedure condemns a range of mechanisms that empower criminal justice officials to act pretextually, since pretextual actions are inconsistent with both the offense restriction and the causation requirement. Because such pretextual mechanisms are widely criticized, these revisionist implications might be applauded. Second, Retributivist Criminal Procedure condemns invalid verdicts. Yet many of procedural rules and norms that are central to the U.S. system of criminal justice (and to due process more broadly construed) have the effect of promoting invalid verdicts. Therefore, these procedural implications call into question whether Refined Retributivism can undergird a just or legitimate criminal justice system.
A. Pretextual Mechanisms
Directly applying Retributivist Criminal Procedure to criminal justice officials rules out pretextual actions. In general, a pretextual action is one where the official's action is prompted by considerations different than those that are sufficient to justify the action, and the prompting considerations are insufficient to justify the action. Pretextual actions violate the causation requirement and the offense restriction, generating cases in which the defendant's offense-related desert bases do not exert a robust causal influence on the official's action and, by implication, the defendant's punishment. crime of distributing narcotics (for which they lacked adequate justification to detain Whren) rather than the traffic offense (for which they had adequate justification). In Whren, the U.S. Instead, pretextual prosecution allowed officials to punish Capone for being a gangster while avoiding establishing that Capone engaged in specific gangster activities. Punishing Capone because of these non-offense-related desert bases is inconsistent with Retributivist Criminal Procedure because it violates both the causation requirement and the offense restriction.
At the verdict stage, the vast majority of verdicts establishing criminal liability arise from plea bargaining, the process whereby a defendant agrees to plead guilty to an offense "in exchange for discretionary consideration on the part of the state," usually "some kind of assurance of a minimal sentence." 77 As the U.S. Supreme Court has observed, "criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials." 78 Most criminal cases in the 76 As then-Attorney General John Ashcroft announced in the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2011, just as Robert F. Kennedy's Justice Department would "arrest mobsters for 'spitting on the sidewalk' if it would help in the battle against organized crime," so too would Ashcroft's Justice Department "use the same aggressive arrest and detention tactics in the war on terror. Bargains and Punishments, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 93, 125-28 (2003) (contending that a prosecutor's offering a plea agreement for a sentence less than the defendant's culpability violates retributivism's categorical duty to punish culpable wrongdoing and wrongs the defendant by punishing him less than is deserved); MOORE, supra note 16, at 156. Thus, pretextual stops, pretextual prosecutions, and plea bargaining are all inconsistent with Retributivist Criminal Procedure. 86 Whren was not punished for his offense-related desert 85 Bordenkircher, 434 U. S. 357 (1978) . 86 To these charges of revisionism, the Refined Retributivist might offer a rebuttal based on the division of labor. On this rebuttal, Retributivist Criminal Procedure applies only to mechanisms that determine a defendant's liability to punishment, rather than to all mechanisms in the criminal justice system. The defendant's offense-related desert bases needn't cause the actions of police or the charging decisions of criminal justice officials. Any problems bases. Nor was Capone. Nor would Hayes have been, had he taken the plea deal. Since all of these features are common in the U.S. criminal justice system, Retributivist Criminal Procedure seems highly revisionist.
Whether these revisionist implications are objectionable depends on the legitimacy of pretextual mechanisms of criminal procedure. A Refined Retributivist might well embrace the charge of revisionism here. Each of the pretextual mechanisms described above is among the most highly criticized aspects of the criminal justice system. 87 Critics have contended that these practices facilitate racial discrimination by officials 88 and contribute to excessive and racially disparate punishment outcomes. 89 Retributivist Criminal Procedure provides an independent criticism of each of these pretextual practices: namely, that they are inconsistent with the notion that an offender should be punished for an offense because she deserves to be punished for that offense.
B. Causation-Obscuring and Justification-Obscuring Mechanisms
Some rules of criminal procedure obscure information relevant to the causation requirement and/or the justification standard, thereby increasing the likelihood of invalid verdicts. These mechanisms are difficult to reconcile with Retributivist Criminal Procedure. Yet many of these introduced at investigative or charging stages can be resolved if the offender's desert bases exert a direct and robust causal influence on the verdict itself. This division-of-labor rebuttal seems powerful, although fully evaluating it is outside the scope of this paper. However, two points about the division-of-labor rebuttal are worth noting. First, the rebuttal concedes that retributivism cannot be the sole principle for regulating the criminal justice system, a concession that some retributivists would be unwilling to make. Second, even if the rebuttal succeeds, Retributivist Criminal Procedure would still have revisionist implications regarding plea bargining, since this practice determines liability to punishment. Thanks to Mihailis Diamantis for encouraging discussion of this rebuttal.
mechanisms are core features of an adversarial system of criminal justice, and some are basic matters of due process.
The rules and norms regarding legal representation of criminal defendants work to frustrate both the causation requirement and the justification standard. The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees the assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings, a provision that has been interpreted to require states to provide counsel for indigent defendants charged with felonies. 90 Beyond these formal requirements, widely recognized professional norms among U.S.
criminal defense lawyers enshrine an ideal of "zealous advocacy." 91 Implicit in the notion of zealous advocacy is that defense counsel is authorized and should be committed to use aggressive tactics (such as strategic delay, presenting misleading testimony, arguing to the jury that evidence supports factual inferences that the lawyer knows to be untrue, calling for nullification, or disclosing information that a lawyer knows "does not contribute to informed determination on the merits because such disclosure injures the prosecution or witnesses") whenever doing so is "advantageous to the client."
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The norms of zealous advocacy are hypothesized to increase the likelihood of invalid verdicts, both systematically and at the case level. As William Simon notes, such norms not only 90 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) .
91 See, e.g., W. William Hodes, Lord Brougham, the Dream Team, and Jury Nullification of the Third Kind, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1075 , 1083 (1996 ("According to the professional conduct rules applicable to American lawyers, once defense counsel enter a case, they must represent their clients 'zealously, within the bounds of law.' This means that defense counsel must attempt to secure the acquittal of the accused, whether or not he is factually guilty, and even if the lawyers know that he is. It is not the obligation of defense counsel to seek the truth-indeed … exactly the opposite is required when the defendant is known by his lawyers to be factually guilty! Furthermore, almost everyone agrees that such situations-where zealous representation is synonymous with obfuscating and distorting the truth-are common.") (citations omitted).
92 William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703 (1993 . Although defendants in the United States have a constitutional right to effective assistance by legal counsel, they do not also have the right that counsel use the aforementioned tactics of aggressive defense. See Margareth Etienne, Remorse, Responsibility, and Regulating Advocacy: Making Defendants Pay for the Sins of Their Lawyers, 78 NYU L. REV. 2103 , 2117 (2003 . Rather, the point is that aggressive defense tactics and norms of zealous defense are thought to be part of contemporary U.S. criminal justice system, and neither is consistent with Retributivist Criminal Procedure. REV. 795, 815-19 (1997) ; Hodes, supra note 91, at 1080-81 ("[T] he Simpson lawyers cannot be faulted or branded as 'unethical' for making jury nullification … the centerpiece of their defense. Indeed, given the duty of zealous advocacy, it was obligatory for these ethical lawyers to make the attempt, one they concluded that doing so was tactically sound.") (citations omitted). Rules excluding evidence from use by the prosecution also promote invalid verdicts, and so may also be condemned by Retributivist Criminal Procedure. Some such evidentiary rules preclude introducing entire categories of evidence as part of the prosecution's case-in-chief.
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97 David Luban notes that "aggressive defense" describes only a "small fraction of criminal representations involving wealthy clients and top-shelf defenders" because " [t] he typical client is poor, and the typical defender is not paid enough to engage in individualized advocacy, let alone [aggressive defense]." Luban, supra note 94, at 1763-64. The situation that Luban describes is actually desirable under Retributivist Criminal Procedure: to the extent that aggressive defense promotes verdict invalidity, the less of it that a system realizes, the better. 469, 475-76 (1948) . 104 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) . The use of the term "Exclusionary Rule" is meant to distinguish this mechanism from the other mechanisms for precluding factfinders from considering categories of evidence. 105 Under the Supreme Court's current doctrine, the main function of the Exclusionary Rule is to deter police misconduct. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) . In prior decisions, the Court has also justified the rule as a way of preserving the integrity of the judicial process. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 659 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960) ). Both the deterrence and the judicial integrity rationales are inconsistent with Retributivist Criminal Procedure. manifested offense-related desert bases, therefore increasing the chance of an invalid verdict in any particular case and the number of invalid verdicts overall. To illustrate this point, consider an alternative version of the Whren case in which the trial court excluded evidence obtained from Whren's vehicle on the grounds that the seizure and search violated the Fourth Amendment. In this scenario, the jury would not have been allowed to consider evidence directly relevant to whether Whren manifested desert bases related to the drug offenses with which Whren was charged. In the absence of such evidence, the jury could either acquit or convict Whren of the charges. In this alternative scenario, an acquittal of Whren would have been invalid, 106 since there was sufficiently good evidence that he manifested offense-related desert bases and therefore (according to Refined Retributivism) that he deserved to be punished for the offense.
On the other hand, if Whren had been convicted in the absence of this search-related evidence, then the conviction might also have been invalid-for example, if the jury had made inferential moves to fill in gaps created by the exclusion of directly relevant evidence.
107
106 This conclusion presupposes a standard that construes validity in terms of the objective or internal reasons in favor of a verdict, rather than the reasons available to the adjudicator at the time of rendering the verdict. 107 Laudan and Allen describe this sort of inferential move regarding evidence of prior crimes. See Laudan and Allen, supra note 102, at 508-9. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence in the United States, the prosecution cannot introduce evidence of a defendant's prior crimes in order to prove bad character or propensity. However, defendants can introduce evidence of good character or a clean record, and the prosecution can introduce evidence of a defendant's bad character or prior bad acts for collateral purposes like impeachment of the defendant's testimony. According to Laudan and Allen, this setup creates a gap: if the defendant has no prior convictions, then the "jury is apt to be told that [by the defendant] in no uncertain terms." Yet "[e]ven when the judge has excluded a defendant's priors, the [defendant] must adopt a very different profile during trial than a defendant without priors would, a profile that should leave few jurors in doubt that [the defendant] has prior convictions, even if the latter go unmentioned explicitly in the trial." Id. at 508. According to Laudan and Allen, the results of both empirical and experimental studies suggest that juries routinely make this kind of inferential move. Id. at 509.
A similar gap applies to evidence that arises from an unlawful search or seizure. Here, too, the prosecution is precluded from introducing unlawfully obtained evidence as part of its case-in-chief, although it can introduce such evidence for collateral purposes like impeaching the defendant's testimony. See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) . Furthermore, if there is no incriminating evidence, then the defendant can highlight this fact. Consider how Laudan and Allen's logic might apply to Whren's case if Whren had succeeded in excluding the evidence of his possession on the grounds that police officers acted unlawfully in stopping him. The prosecution would not have been able to introduce direct evidence of Whren's possession as part of its case-in-chief. However, Whren would likely have been precluded from testifying on his own behalf. Had Whren testified to the effect that he did not Retributivist Criminal Procedure is therefore in tension with norms of zealous advocacy and the Exclusionary Rule. Given these implications, Refined Retributivists are (perhaps surprisingly) allied with consequentialists like Bentham on many questions of criminal procedure.
108 Whereas consequentialists would justify these revisions to the extent that they increase verdict accuracy, Retributivist Criminal Procedure might justify them as a way to avoid invalid verdicts.
109
Norms of zealous advocacy and the Exclusionary Rule are not necessarily central to due process. As a doctrinal matter, neither of these mechanisms are considered "fundamental to the American scheme of justice," which is one standard for characterizing requirements of due process. 110 A defendant whose lawyer provides less-than-zealous advocacy is not entitled to a possess drugs, the state could have used the fruits of the unlawful stop to impeach his testimony. Thus, on Laudan and Allen's logic, from the absence of Whren's testifying that he did not possess the drugs, the jury might infer that he did possess the drugs.
Inferential moves like the ones that Laudan and Allen describe are violations of Retributivist Criminal Procedure because the defendant's offense-related desert bases do not play the kind of direct, robust causal role in the judgment that the defendant is liable to punishment that Refined Retributivism requires. To the extent that the defendant's offense related desert bases play some causal role in this judgment, it would seem to be an instance of an indirect or "deviant" kind of causation. See Sorensen, supra note 49, at 172. Punishment in such cases would violate both the directness and robustness aspects of the causation requirement, for the same reasons that the mechanism described in the Lottery case does. Likewise, a defendant's rights to be tried by a jury reflecting a "fair cross-section" of the provides direct evidence about whether she manifested offense-related desert bases. Excluding this type of evidence increases the possibility that the defendant's offense-related desert bases will not causally influence the verdict. It also increases the chances that a defendant's nonoffense-related desert bases will exert influence. Both of these prospects are unacceptable under Retributivist Criminal Procedure, since each increases the likelihood of invalid verdicts.
Likewise, the privilege obscures epistemic justification by precluding the factfinder from accessing a source of potentially good reasons. In light of these effects, it seems plausible that, ceteris peribus, a system in which defendants lacked rights against self-incrimination would have fewer invalid verdicts than a system in which they had this right.
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The same logic applies to all of the other procedural rules described above. These rules are justified by goals (such as fairness or legitimacy or accuracy) that are hostile to Retributivist
Criminal Procedure. The effect (and, in many cases, the point) of these rules is to preclude an offender's desert bases from causing his liability or to frustrate the realization of the justification standard. Therefore, each of these procedural mechanisms are difficult to reconcile with Retributivist Criminal Procedure. .
These tensions should trouble the Refined Retributivist. A comprehensive account of due process in criminal procedure would be necessary to fully vindicate the importance of each of these rules. Absent such an account, it is enough to note that each of these features meets the lower due process standard of being "fundamental to the American scheme of justice," 125 and many of these features meet the higher due process standard of being part of the "very essence of 124 Retributivist Criminal Procedure therefore supports abolishing the privilege on grounds that resemble those advanced by Bentham and others-namely, that the privilege affects the accuracy of verdicts by benefitting the guilty and not the innocent. See JEREMY BENTHAM, A TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (1825), at 241; Bentham, supra note 99, at 451-4. a scheme of ordered liberty."
126 At first glance, Retributivist Criminal Procedure not only fails to capture why these procedural rules are important, but also can be read to imply that the criminal justice system should modify or eliminate them.
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CONCLUSION
Retributivist theories of punishment can be described in both simple and refined versions, depending on how an offender's desert bases must figure in the effectuation of normatively justified punishment. Refined Retributivism seems, at first blush, to be superior to Simple 127 Consider the following position, which is consistent with Refined Retributivism. The goal of retributivist criminal procedure is not to ensure valid verdicts, but rather to protect against invalid inflictions of punishment. Therefore, every normatively infliction of punishment must satisfy the causation requirement and justification standard. However, invalid acquittals are not necessarily problematic. Procedural values unrelated to an offender's desert bases might both prompt and normatively justify acquitting her, even if these same considerations could not (consistent with Refined Retributivism) prompt and normatively punishing her.
As far as I know, no retributivist has articulated anything like this position. Moreover, defending this position would be a tall order. However, such a position might tame some (although not all) of the revisionist tendencies of Retributivist Criminal Procedure. Thanks to Nathan Hanna for suggesting this point.
